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Justice William 0. Douglas and the
Concept of a "Fair Trial"
. .Helen Shirley Thomas*
Basic to Justice Douglas' concept of a free society is a fair, unbiased

trial for all, regardless of the race, ethnic or economic background of
the accused. The author examines Douglas' views in regard to the

right to counsel, detention of the accused, bail, the right to trial by
jury, and trial procedures to determine the content of his concept of a
"fair trial."

For Justice William 0. Douglas, one of the basic characteristics
of a free society is the unbiased treatment accorded persons accused
of crime. It is imperative that the individual be respected in his
unique capacity; it is equally necessary that the integrity of society
remain above reproach when it turns its enormous force and power
to the task of apprehending and convicting criminals. Society can
be said to be vindicated when, and only when, a just conviction is
reached after all substantive and procedural rights of the accused
are honored from the moment of his apprehension, through his detention, to the conduct of his trial in an impartial manner. Justice
Douglas' credo on this issue is clear, unequivocal, and succinct. He
has recently given voice to his belief by quoting an inscription on
the walls of the Department of Justice: "The United States wins its
point whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts."1 Justice
can never be done if there is societal infringement on individual
rights, even the rights of the most unsavory character.
While the above quotation refers specifically to the United States,
Justice Douglas does not hold the states to any lesser degree of
accountability. A "fair trial" for him must conform to the same high
standards irrespective of whether federal or state authorities are
being called to account. This may result from Justice Douglas' wellknown acceptance of the so-called incorporation theory whereby the
entire Bill of Rights is made applicable to the states by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, or it may stem from his belief
that the ingredients of a "fair trial" are invariables which do not
change from tribunal to tribunal.
This article seeks briefly to demonstrate the ways in which this
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Loyola College, Baltimore, Md.
1. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 89 (1963).
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basic commitment of Justice Douglas bear on particular constitutional
issues, particularly with regard to criminal cases. The article treats
these issues under five general headings: detention; the right to
counsel; bail; the right to trial by jury; and trial procedures. Some
overlapping between sections cannot be avoided; but it is hoped
that this organization will bring the problems more sharply into focus.
I. DETENTIMON
"Whenever unfairness can be shown to infect any part of a criminal
proceeding, we should hold that the requirements of due process are
lacking." 2 Thus did Justice Douglas summarize his position in a case
involving the actions of a grand jury. This statement of principle can
be applied to his over-all view of criminal proceedings, beginning
with the apprehension and interrogation stage. It is fundamental
that any suspect immediately be brought before a magistrate and
openly charged with the suspected crime. Only in this way can
what the Justice considers abusive police tactics be eradicated. The
practice of protective custody, whereby a prisoner is held solely at
the discretion of law officers, leads almost inevitably to inquisitorial
sessions and other third-degree methods. Justice Douglas has strongly
denounced such results, remarking that "detention without arraignment is a time-honored method for keeping the accused under the
exclusive control of the police. They can operate at their leisure.
The accused is wholly at their mercy." 3 Out of protective custody
often come confessions of dubious validity as to the voluntariness
with which they were made. This fact makes Justice 4Douglas highly
indignant when arraignment is unnecessarily delayed.
When protective custody is employed, the individual who is detained may be given the opportunity to get in touch with friends,
relatives or legal counsel. However, on just as many occasions, he is
denied any access to the outside world.
Justice Douglas has long implied that the denial of access to counsel
at this point, even though prior to arraignment, is an unconstitutional
infringement of a citizen's rights,5 a view which the Court has now
2. Beck v.Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 581 (1962).
3. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 57 (1949). Cf. Agoston v. Pennsylvania, 340 U.S.
844 (1950).
4. The writer does not mean to imply that trustworthiness of confessions is the
sole problem involved in these cases. Exclusionary rules of evidence also serve as a
means of regulating police conduct in general. See Allen, Due Prcoess and State
Criminal Procedures: Another Look, 48 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 16 (1953); Inbau, The
Confession Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. REv. 442 (1948);
Spanogle, The Use of Coerced Confessions in State Courts, 17 VAND. L. Rnv. 421
(1964).
5. Epstein, Justice Douglas and Civil Liberties, 26 Wis. L. R-v. 19,5 (1951).
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espoused at least in part.6
Detention incommunicado is fraught with evil opportunities from
beginning to end. While it is agreed that "the police have to interrogate to arrest," Justice Douglas adds the important qualification that
"they may [not] arrest to interrogate." 7 In other words, they may not
hold a person by a system of administrative detention endlessly
incommunicado and use the time so derived to question him incessantly about any matters which may come to their attention. Not
only is the question of a coerced confession immediately raised but
also the broader issue of the limits of self-incrimination. One of the
underlying infirmities of detention incommunicado has to do with
the type of person trapped by this procedure. A wealthy or prominent
person is not likely to be denied his request for external aid. Indeed,
it would be ludicrous folly for the police to attempt incommunicado
detention for the vast majority of American citizens. The group of
persons against whom such detention can be employed successfully
are those with no social status or those who come from a lowly
environment. For Justice Douglas, this is the very group which
needs the law's special protection.8
Closely related to the problems discussed above are those which
surround what Justice Douglas has dubbed "legal" detention. In this
instance, a man is arrested on one count, often of a rather minor
nature, while the police are actually interested in his activities with
regard to a different crime, usually one of a more serious nature and
one more difficult to prove. At least two police purposes are served
by this technique. First, the suspect is conveniently taken out of
circulation. Second, the police always have access to the prisoner
for further and prolonged questioning. Justice Douglas has castigated
such subterfuge and has held that, even though police efficiency
may be reduced by curtailing the practice of "legal" detention, the
price is not too high to pay for maintaining the integrity of our legal
system. 9
In condemning these procedures, Justice Douglas is motivated by a
fear that they will inevitably produce coerced confessions. It matters
not whether the victim has been subjected to unconstitutional pressures before arraignment, 10 or after arraignment." It does not even
make a difference to the Justice whether a civilian or a member of
6. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
7. Reek v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 448 (1961).

8. See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); DOUGLAS, WE
367 (1956).
9. United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36 (1951).
10. See Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951).
11. See Spano v. New York 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
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the military services is involved. 12 For all American citizens at all
stages of their involvement with the police, certain rudimentary protections are always available. The use of force, whether of a physical
or psychological nature, invalidates a confession. Interrogation in
secret is pre-emptory evidence that a confession has been irregularly
obtained. Circumvention of the law by police officers, as found in
"legal" detention, is especially reprehensible. Justice Douglas has
firmly committed himself to the position that "it is the right of the
accused to be tried by a legally constituted court, not by a kangaroo
court."' 3 If the police can act as a preliminary tribunal, both
accusing and forcing confession, then unavoidably and undesirably
our concept of justice and our court system will be damaged to the
detriment of all our people.

II.

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

"Happily," for Justice Douglas, "all constitutional questions are
always open." 14 It was especially gratifying in this instance for the
Supreme Court was overruling the "ill-starred decision in Betts v.
Brady,"' and proclaiming in Gideon v. Wainwright1 6 that the states
must furnish counsel to indigent defendants in criminal prosecutions.17
Justice Douglas was one of the three dissenters in the Betts case
and, since its decision in 1942, had been attacking the idea that
counsel must be furnished in only the most unusual circumstances.' 8
Perhaps it was more than a coincidence that Mr. Abe Fortas, who
was selected by the Court to represent Gideon's interest, had also
been Justice Douglas' chief assistant when the latter carried on investigations for the Securities and Exchange Commission during the
early days of the New Deal.
The prime reason why Justice Douglas has been so adamant over
the need for counsel stems from his belief that most of the inequities
discussed in the first part of this paper could be eliminated or
greatly reduced if adequate legal advice were available to an accused.
This need is apparent from the very first moment when an individual
is called to account by any legal authority, for in those very first
moments constitutional rights may mistakenly be given up, never
to be recalled. They will largely be lost through ignorance or inadvertance. Because such is the case, Justice Douglas feels that "the
12. See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
13. Williams v. United States, supra note 8, at 101 (1951).
14. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 346 (1963).
15. Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 677 (1948).
16. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

17. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
18. See, e.g., DOUGLAS, WE

= JuDGES 382-84 (1956).
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right to have counsel at the pretrial stage is often necessary to give
meaning and protection to the right to be heard at the trial itself." 19
If the lack of legal advice at pre-trial stage can prejudice a case
because of inadequate defense preparation, approach of the pleading
stage without like assistance can prove permanently detrimental.
The untrained individual faced with the prospect of entering a plea
upon which the remainder of the proceedings will rest is at a terrible
disadvantage. Issues of fact and of law may be so complex that
the layman cannot disentangle them. By his plea he may irrevocably
commit himself to a course of action which is unwise and unnecessary. Therefore, for the individual's protection, Justice Douglas has
insisted that counsel be appointed in time to fashion a reasonable
plea, given the facts of the case and the law prevailing in the court's
jurisdiction.2 0
Clarence Earl Gideon was enough of a prison lawyer to demand
that his trial court furnish him counsel. Not all persons charged with
a crime are sage or adroit enough to ask for assistance. Consequently,
another ingredient of a "fair trial" for Justice Douglas involves the
court's responsibility to the accused. Believing that "a defendant is
not capable of making his own defense," the Justice has held that "it
is the duty of the court to appoint counsel, whether requested so to
do or not."2 ' And it has made no difference to him whether the person
stood accused of a capital crime. The need of the defendant for aid,
not the nature of the crime, is determinative. Justice Douglas has
little patience with those who suggest that his view would lead to
legal assistance for one charged with violation of a parking ordinance. He believes that a line can be drawn, but to draw that line
between those facing the death penalty and those facing prolonged
imprisonment is neither prudent nor reasonable.2 2
A great deal of recent criticism of the Supreme Court centers
on the fact that unsavory characters are often the beneficiaries of
rulings guaranteeing procedural or substantive rights. Somehow if
the defendant could have been a little more "respectable" the rulings
would apparently have seemed more justified. To Justice Douglas
this is plainly nonsense if for no other reason than the fact that
"respectable" people rarely become embroiled in criminal proceedings. It is the underdog, the uneducated, the economically deprived
who is most apt to need protection. Peculiarly enough, some lower
courts have tended to assume that because a man is educated he, too,
19. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 443 (1958).
20. See Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962); Williams v. Kaiser, 323
U.S. 471 (1945).

21. Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173,181 (1946).
22. See Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948).
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does not need counsel. Justice Douglas forthrightly rejected this
implication.
The Court speaks of the education of this petitioner and his ability to take
care of himself.. . . No matter how well educated and how well trained
in the law an accused may be, he is sorely in need of legal advice once he
is arrested for an offense .... The innocent as well as the guilty may be
caught in a web of circumstantial evidence that is difficult to break. A man
may be guilty of indiscretions but not of crime. He may be implicated by
He desperately needs a
ambiguous circumstances difficult to explain away.
lawyer to help extricate him if he's innocent. 3

It does not matter whether the accused is educated or illiterate,
wealthy or destitute, a member of a majority or minority group, he
can just as easily get lost in the labyrinth of the law. He needs a
trained guide who can lead him safely over unknown terrain.
One of the obstacles which a trained eye would avoid would be
the pitfall of rushing headlong into a confession. Confession may be
good for the soul but in terms of legal maneuvering it may be
damning. A confession often obviates the need for a trial before
judge and jury, a trial which could introduce evidence of extenuating
circumstances or which could present other special factors for consideration. As will be demonstrated, the jury system is at the very
heart of the "fair triar' concept for Justice Douglas. He looks askance
at any suggestion that a layman, without counsel should have the
right to waive a jury trial in order to exercise the high privilege
of conducting his defense in his own manner. "That argument," for
him, "is faintly reminiscent of those notions of freedom of choice and
liberty of contract which long denied protection to the individual in
other fields."2 The individual has a constitutional right to a jury
trial; he has no constitutional right to reject impetuously and uninformed one of his main lines of protection. In the event that the
accused neither confesses nor waives his right to a jury trial, Justice
Douglas is still convinced that the presence of counsel is an absolute
necessity. The ways in which facts are marshalled, the trial lawyer's
intuitive reaction to the mood of the jury, the time when objections
should be raised, these are talents developed by diligent study and
steady application. They are not talents which the average defendant
can display. Left to his own devices, he will at least be confounded
by intricate procedural rules" with which he cannot cope and he

will, in all probability, make an unfavorable impression upon the
jury. Thus the injury is doubly compounded. The defendant does
not, for all practical purposes, have his day in court and "the jury
23. Crooker v. California, supra note 16, at 446-47 (1958).
24. Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269, 286 (1942).
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system-pride of the English-speaking world-becomes a trap for the
layman because he is utterly without ability to make it serve the ends
of justice."15 These injuries could be avoided if counsel were appointed in all criminal trials, a result which now seems inevitable in
light of Gideon.
As part of its legislative program, the Kennedy Administration
proposed establishment of a public defender system which would,
on a rotating basis, provide competent counsel for an accused in all
federal criminal cases. Justice Douglas supported the proposal
strongly.2 If more members of the legal profession could be persuaded to think of their duties as servants of society, then they
would re-familiarize themselves with the crucial problems of society
as reflected in criminal trials. The burden of defense would be lifted
from the shoulders of the dedicated few and the many would return
to their respective law offices with a better understanding of the
intricate nature of human relationships. This has been a course of
action urged upon the legal profession by Justice Douglas for a number of years and it has been a recurrent theme in his many speeches.
The bar to live up to its high purpose and to fulfill its necessary
mission must individually and collectively make itself responsible
for providing legal assistance to any individual facing criminal prosecution in state or federal courts.

III.

BAIm

Up to this point, focus has been placed on the vital prerequisites
of a "fair trial" in terms of apprehension, detention and representation. Another aspect of the picture is the use and misuse of bail.
Generally, the accused in a non-capital case may, at the discretion
of the court, be admitted to bail. Justice Douglas feels that the
accused is thereby benefited in two respects: "it permits the unhampered preparation of a defense, and it serves to save the accused
from being punished prior to his conviction."2 7 Of course there is
always the possibility that the person admitted to bail will take
flight, but that is one of the risks inherent in our concept of justice.
If reasonable bail is set after considering the peculiar circumstances
surrounding the particular individual, government is adequately protected and the individual in the vast majority of cases will appear to
stand trial.
A significant number of Justice Douglas' Opinions in Chambers deal
with bail, many with the problem of how to determine just what is
25. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 524 (1962).
26. See N.Y. Times, April 4, 1963, p. 37, col. 5.
27. DouGLAs, AN ALMANAC oF LimBTrr 137 (1954).
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"reasonable." He believes that "there is a constitutional question that
lurks in every bail case," 28 a question arising from the eighth amendment's prohibition against "excessive bail." To set a figure that would
stagger the imagination would obviously invalidate the action. Reasonableness depends upon checking into all the relevant facts concerning the individual: his wealth, his character, the type of crime
of which he is accused, and his prior record or lack thereof. In his
Opinions in Chambers, the Justice is particularly concerned with the
plight of the indigent defendant. The indigent is denied equal protection of the law if he is denied the right to appeal his case solely
because of poverty. Likewise, Justice Douglas believes that special
consideration is due the indigent with regard to bail. He has asked,
almost rhetorically, "Can an indigent be denied freedom, where a
wealthy man would not, because he does not happen to have enough
property to pledge for his freedom?" 2 9 His answer was an unequivocal
"no." The reason given was that fixing bail, even in a modest amount,
would have the effect of denying the indigent release. While in
prison, he could not aid in preparing his cause, he would have a
period of freedom denied for which society could never repay, and
finally he would be denied the opportunity to seek employment and
the monies necessary for his defense.
Akin to his belief in the benefits of bail is Justice Douglas' preference for a broad interpretation of the habeas corpus jurisdiction of
the federal courts. Or, as he has expressed it, "[habeas corpus] has
done high service in the administration of justice." 30 Often when
cases reach the Supreme Court, the record shows that important
constitutional issues have been dealt with inadequately at the state
court level. Justice Douglas sees the great writ of habeas corpus as
providing a safety valve whereby the issues can be clarified, new
pertinent material inserted into the record, and many costly mistakes
rectified.
IV. TBE JuRY

While Justice Douglas and the late Jerome Frank held very similar
views of the judicial process, they disagreed over the utility of the
jury system. Judge Frank was highly critical of the system whereas
Justice Douglas has been one of its staunchest supporters. The Justice
interprets broadly the fifth amendments command that indictment
be by a grand jury. He has interpreted this to mean, additionally
and in conjunction with the sixth amendment, that there must be a
28. Carlisle v. Landon, 73 Sup. Ct. 1179, 1182 (1953).
29. Bandy v. United States, 81 Sup. Ct. 197, 198 (1960).
30. Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156, 171 (1957).
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trial before a petit jury, that there must be a right to counsel and
that there must be the right to have the accused confront his
accuser.31 Justice Douglas has called the right to trial by jury "one
of the most important safeguards against tyranny which our law
has designed." 32 He would even, by an interpretation of the Articles
of War, make a jury trial obligatory upon military authorities unless
outright hostilities prevented this course of action.
On two occasions Justice Douglas has used the same words verbatim to describe his views on the characteristics of a jury. Phraseology so obviously important to him merits reproduction here.
A jury reflects the attitudes and mores of the community from which it is

drawn. It lives only for the day and does justice according to its lights.
The group of twelve, who are drawn to hear a case, makes the decision

and melts away. It is not present the next day to be criticized. It is the

one governmental agency that has no ambition. It is as human as the

people who make it up. It is sometimes the victim of passion. But it also

takes the sharp edges off a law and uses conscience to ameliorate a hardship. Since it is of and from the community, it gives the law an acceptance
which verdicts of judges could not do.33

The jury, then, becomes the vehicle through which community concepts of justice can help temper the law's strictness, thus assuring
that a "fair trial" in terms of current mores will be afforded the
defendant. Doubtless juries have in some instances inflicted injustices. (But, one must remember, so have many jurists.) Juries,
to the Justice's mind, bring a quality of mercy to the decisional
process, a quality too often lacking when the courtroom is treated
as surgically sterile as an operating room. The jury may, indeed, infect
the atmosphere but the germs which it releases are likely to be the
benign ones of tolerance and understanding rather than the injurious
ones of legal intransigence and stodgy acceptance of outmoded
principles.
Since, in most jurisdictions, an accused must be indicted by a
grand jury, that type of jury plays a special role in the concept of a
"fair trial" and has received rather protracted attention from Justice
Douglas.34 The grand jury has an awesome responsibility to fulfill
for it must initially determine if there is probable guilt to justify
detention of an individual for formal trial. Usually, the grand jury
31. See DOUGLAS, FREEDOM OF =x MmqD 23 (1964).
32. Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228, 234 (1959).
33. DOUGLAS, WE THE JUDGES 389 (1956); and DOUGLAS, AN ALMANAC OF Lmiary
112 (1954).
34. See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry,
339 U.S. 594, 599 (1950); United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,
233-34 (1940). These cases decided even decades apart show Justice Douglas' continuing interest in the topic from early after his appointment to the Court to the present.
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returns an indictment against a man without hearing his version of
the occurrences surrounding the alleged crime. Additionally, grand
jury testimony is confidential and not part of the public record, an
aspect of the proceedings which Justice Douglas finds unreasonable
and believes should be abolished once the grand jury's particular
responsibilities are ended. Grand juries are the only body accusatorial
in nature permitted by the Constitution for the federal government.
They act in secret, often on hearsay evidence. These usually abhorred
practices are permitted on the assumption that the grand jury has a
special mission. The grand jury was created to prevent a government
vendetta against any individual, and to prevent irreparable harm
to reputation by unfounded, public accusation of crime. The laymen
who compose these juries may be mistaken in certain of their judgments, but, for the most part freed from technical rules, they act
without prejudice and are impartial spokesmen for the conscience of
the community. They provide fairness in indictment before the trial
stage.
The Supreme Court has become increasingly concerned over the
problem of discrimination, regardless of whether it is practiced on
the basis of race, religion, or nationality differences. Nowhere for
justice Douglas is discrimination more invidious than when it infiltrates the procedure for jury selection. The jury, whether grand or
petit, must reflect an adequate cross-section of society or otherwise
it will be unable fully to perform its function which is to mirror
community consensus. The very concept of a so-called "blue-ribbon"
jury is for him a contradiction in terms. Education, economic status, or
knowledgeability should not be the criteria for choosing a jury panel.
And neither should sex. When women were systematically excluded
from jury service only because of their gender, Justice Douglas raised
a voice in protest.3
Discrimination has been most blatantly practiced on the basis of
race. Since such discrimination strikes at the very heart of the "fair
trial" concept, Justice Douglas has been unstinting in his judicial
efforts to curb state practices which even hint at discrimination. The
whole issue for him boils down to this: "The Constitution gives
Negroes the right to be tried by juries drawn from the entire community, not hand-picked from white people alone." 36 The real point
was that an all-white jury, per se, if chosen at random and by mere
chance from the list of eligible voters, would not necessarily be
unconstitutional. It is when officials manipulate the lists purposefully
to create a jury all of one race that the action becomes unacceptable.
35. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
36. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 206 (1953).
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The recent attempt of Louisiana to circumvent a possible charge of
discrimination by deliberately placing a Negro on a jury trying a
case of another of his race was struck down because it involved
'unnatural manipulation. 37 Not only was the state paying mere lipservice to the principle of equal protection but also it was paying
the tribute in a manner which did not comport with the requirements
of due process of law.
While Justice Douglas is an advocate of a strong jury system, he
does look more critically at jury action when first amendment rights
are invoked. Specifically, he is concerned with the role of judge and
jury in censorship cases when obscenity is the issue. He was particularly disturbed by a New York state statute which made one
conviction for distributing obscene literature the basis for contempt
proceedings if the same publication appeared elsewhere in the state.
He felt that a judge and jury in Albany might make a different determination of what was obscene than might its counterpart in Rochester.
Juries do vary on definitions and this variance is caused by differing
community mores and the particular circumstances of each case. If
the jury was to be used in this type of proceeding, then it should be
allowed to make an independent appraisal of just what constitutes
obscenity. But Justice Douglas has serious reservations about using
a jury in this capacity at all. "Free speech," he has stated, "is not
to be regulated like diseased cattle and impure butter. The audience
hissed yesterday may applaud
(in this case the judge or the jury) that
38
today, even the same performance."
Even in the sensitive area of censorship, if there is to be punishment meted out it should be by jury proceedings and not by the
contempt method. Justice Douglas has been joined by Justice Hugo
L. Black in denouncing a growing tendency to withdraw more and
more matters from jury consideration. When, in January, 1963, the
United States Supreme Court proposed changes in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure which would have allowed lower court judges
greater discretion in granting motions for directed verdicts without
submitting the question to a jury, Justices Black and Douglas criticized the modifications. Although agreeing that no momentous
changes were wrought, they felt that by its actions the Supreme
Court was giving "formal sanction to the process by which the courts
have been wresting from the juries the power to render verdicts.
Since we do not approve this sapping of the seventh amendment
of a jury trial, we cannot join even this technical coup de
guarantee
39
grace."
37. Collins v. Walker, 335 F.2d 417 (1964).
38. Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 447 (1957).
39. Quoted in the Baltimore Sun, January 22, 1963.
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While the general maintenance of jury trials is of utmost importance
to Justice Douglas, he has been particularly vigorous in their defense
in two significant fields. These are the disparate areas of litigation
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act and the equally complex
determination of a definition for legal sanity.40 In adjudging sanity,
Justice Douglas is a supporter of the Durham rule, rather than the
older M'Naghten approach whereby sanity was made to depend upon
an ability to tell right from wrong.41 Under the Durham rule, all
medical and psychiatric knowledge about the defendant is made
available to the jury, and it is up to the jury to evaluate this testimony
and to determine whether the defendant was insane at the time of
the crime. Basically, "the question whether society should assess
punishment for criminal conduct, is, in the last analysis, a moral judgment. The jury, being of the community, reflects its attitudes and
speaks for it." Nowhere is this statement more necessary or more
conclusive than when a question of sanity is raised. For here the
jury must decide the factual issue of guilt, determine the question
of motivation, and, if it finds the condemned act the product of a
diseased mind, adjudge whether society wants to inflict a punishment.
Of course, it would be the jury which would render a final decision
under the M'Naghten rule also, but without the same kind of knowledge put in evidence for it to consider. As Justice Douglas phrased
the argument:
After the Durham case, as before, the jury has the final say. The psychiatrist

merely expounds of the theoretical and clinical aspects of the problem. The
jury evaluates his testimony, as it does the evidence on every other factual
issue.... But the Durham case puts at the jury's disposal all the wisdom,
all the knowledge that medicine and psychiatry have to offer in answering

the question whether the defendant was insane at the time of the act, and

rule
whether the act was a product of the insanity. Under the Durham
43

no one principle of psychiatry is turned into a principle of law.

Justice Douglas is also concerned with the interrelationship of sanity
and a jury trial from a slightly different perspective. In some states, a
person may be declared insane by medical authorities before trial and
be committed to an institution for an indeterminate period. His condition may improve to the point where, under any definition, he could
not be considered insane. Yet, because of his commitment, he may
never receive his day in court. To avoid this infringement of individual rights, Justice Douglas would prefer to see any declaration of
40. See Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105 (1954).
41. See Douglas, Durham Rule: A Meeting Ground for Lawyers and Psychiatrists,41
IowA L. REv. 485 (1956).
42. DouGLAs, LAW AN PsYcxAmnY 10 (1956).
43. DoucLAs, op. cit. supra note 33 at 485-90.
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insanity made in open court, before commitment, with definite provisions for reconsideration of mental status included. Under this
procedure, the individual could subsequently be tried for the crime.
In assessing the question of legal guilt, however, the jury would be
informed that, at the time the crime was committed, the person was
considered mentally irresponsible for his actions.
Cases brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act have
also emphasized Justice Douglas' belief in the jury as being an
indispensable ingredient of a "fair trial." A few years after he became a member of the Supreme Court, the Justice explained at some
length his reasons for this belief.
The right to trial by jury is a "basic and fundamental feature of our

system of federal jurisprudence." . . . It is part and parcel of the remedy
afforded ...

workers under the Employers' Liability Act. Reasonable care

and cause and effect are as elusive here as in other fields. But the jury

has been chosen as the appropriate tribunal to apply those standards to the

facts of these personal injuries. That method of determining the liability
of carriers and of placing on them the cost of these industrial accidents

may be crude, archaic, and expensive as compared with the more modem

systems of workmen's compensation. But however inefficient and backward
it may be, it is the system which Congress has provided. To deprive these

workers of the benefits of a jury trial in close or doubtful cases is to take
away a goodly portion of the relief which Congress afforded them. 44

Throughout his tenure, he has continued to adhere to this position
and has become one of the Court's most outspoken advocates for a
liberal interpretation of its power to review and to act as a final
arbiter in FELA disputes.4 5
Justice Douglas has not been in agreement with a number of his
brethren on the role which the Court should play in these types of
disputes. He has become quite incensed when litigation involving
liability has been brought up to the Court by a certiorari vote of four
only to have the case dismissed as being improvidently granted by
the vote of the other five members. 46 He has also seemingly resented
the suggestion that the Court will be more amenable to overturning
lower court judgments when these judgments have gone against
the worker rather than the employer.4 7 He believes that the lower
courts have not given a friendly reception to the FELA with its
jury provisions and have therefore been too inclined to withdraw
doubtful questions of fact from the jury and to resolve them in favor
of the employer. In sum, and reflecting his attitude toward the entire
44.
45.
46.
47.
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question, Justice Douglas finds "the difference between the majority
and minority of the Court . . . concerns the degree of vigilance

we should exercise in safeguarding the jury trial-guaranteed by the
Seventh Amendment. . 48 He, for one, believes the vigil should
never end.
V. THE TRmL
"One reason the means are so important to us is that in a vivid
sense the individual stands above the state and can insist on a strict
accounting from it." 49 These words encompass in a general sense
Justice Douglas' view that any doubts about the procedure or conduct
of a trial should be resolved in favor of the citizen. All actions of
government touching upon a trial at any stage and in any manner
must be, like Caesar's wife, above reproach. The sixth amendment
lays out, with some specificity, certain minimal requirements for the
federal government, requirements which the Justice thinks are also
applicable to the states. He has given a very literal interpretation
to the demands that a trial be speedy and that it be held in the
district in which the crime was supposedly committed51 These requirements were put into the Constitution by the framers because
they believed that only by such procedures could there be a "fair
trial." Justice Douglas shares this belief.
Certain other procedures, while not directly forbidden by the
Constitution, are so harmful in their effects that they may destroy
the impartiality of a trial and thereby deny the defendant due process
of law. For example, Justice Douglas is convinced that, except under
the most unusual circumstances, the accused has the right to a
complete trial before the tribunal first chosen to judge him. He takes
a very niggardly view of a judge's discretion to discharge a jury
before it has reached a verdict.5 ' This is especially true when a request for a mistrial is made by the prosecution. "Once the prosecution
can call a halt in the middle of a trial in order to await a more
favorable time, or to find new evidence, or to make up the deficiencies
in the testimony of its witnesses, the promise of protection against
double jeopardy loses the great force it was thought to have when
the Constitution was written." 52 The threat of repeated harassment
and subsequent prosecution at a later date when it is more agreeable
to the government are burdens which he does not believe a defendant should have to bear.
48.
49.
50.
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Even when the prosecution confesses error and asks, not for a mistrial, but for the dismissal of the charges altogether, Justice Douglas
would be hesitant before approving such a request. 3 In other words,
once a case has been heard on its merits, a decision should be forthcoming. If the courts are merely to be rubberstamps for the prosecution, they will lose their independence entirely. There may be a
number of reasons for confessing error, among them honest mistakes
of judgment. But confession of error in one case can be used as a
maneuver to save the government's cause in another litigation. The
harm done to the accused, who in reality is neither cleared nor convicted, is in terms of his reputation and his future standing in the
community. He deserves better treatment at the hands of the law.
The prosecution must also represent its majesty and integrity. Therefore when one prosecutor recently suppressed evidence favorable to
the accused, Justice Douglas for the Supreme Court held that due
process of law had been violated and then went on with a dissertation
on the behavior expected of officers of the courts.5
The sixth amendment in addition to providing for a speedy trial
also declares that that trial should be public. With certain reservations noted below, justice Douglas has interpreted this provision to
mean that the news media may make fair comment on the progress of
a trial or on the demeanor of its participants, from judge, to lawyers,
to defendant.55 This is so because "newspaper comment on trials,
though ill-tempered or prejudiced, is part of our freedom of speech
and of press."5 He displays little patience with judges who take
offense at criticisms of their actions and he is especially against the
use of contempt citations to silence or punish such criticisms. If the
news media step beyond the bounds of fair comment or if their
actions so prejudice a community that an impartial judgment cannot
be reached, there are remedies other than contempt that can be
applied. Prejudice can be overcome by a change of venue. Libelous
or slanderous statements can be made the basis for a civil or criminal
charge. In this event, however, those called to the bar of justice
would be accorded all the safeguards of criminal procedures inherent
in a "fair trial" and would not be subject to summary punishment
by the judge at his own discretion.
The advent of radio, and especially of television, has caused some
rethinking on justice Douglas' part as to what the framers of the
53. Casey v. United States, 343 U.S. 808 (1952).
54. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
55. See, e.g., Craig v. Harvey, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155
(1949).
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Constitution meant by a "public" trial. He has come to the conclusion that
The concept of the public trial is not that every member of the community

should be able to see or hear it. A public trial means one that is open '
rather than closed-a trial that people other than officials can attend. The
public trial exists because of the aversion which liberty-loving people had
toward secret trials and proceedings. . . . That is the reason our courts
the
are open to the public, not because the Framers vanted to provide
57
public with recreation or with instruction in the ways of government.

He finds photographing, broadcasting or televising trials highly
disruptive of the serene atmosphere in a courtroom, an atmosphere
which is most conducive to arrival at a calm and considered judgment.
Perhaps more than any other media, television can focus mass attention and therefore mass opinion on the delicate question of guilt or
innocence. And for Justice Douglas, "[mass opinion] is anathema to
the very conception of a fair trial."58 Innocence or guilt may be
measured mathematically, but it is the mathematics of the twelve
good men and true of the jury who unanimously announce their
verdict after due consideration, not the mathematics of a popularity
contest entered into on the spur of the moment.
The final televised moments of the trial of Jack Ruby in the Dallas
courtroom of Judge Joe Brown about a year ago must surely have
confirmed Justice Douglas' dislike for the raucous, impassioned, and
foreign influences which television can bring to a forum which is
supposed to be the sacrosanct seat of justice. If the courts of this
land are to continue to be the final refuge for both innocent and
guilty alike, if they are to be the final spokesmen on perilous issues
of life and death, freedom and imprisonment, then they must live
up to the finest traditions of Anglo-American judicial practice. They
must never deviate from the highest procedural standards or divert
their attention from the substantive end of equal justice under law.
A "fair trial," in the broad context that Justice William 0. Douglas
uses the term, will go far toward creating the environment in which
American jurisprudence can make a real contribution to human welfare and human understanding.
57. Douglas, The Public Trial and the Free Press, 46 A.B.A.J. 840, 842 (1960).
58. Id. at 844.

